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Confronting an ongoing debate from the outside is somewhat like
arriving in a foreign land. One knows something about the human species
but perhaps has never experienced the local culture or encountered its
norms. What is considered trivial and what is considered important? What
do we observe of the locals? What do we consider unusual that they do not
observe or consider unusual of themselves? And what does this foreign
culture reveal to us about our own?
The matter is complicated somewhat, perhaps, when the foreign land
one is visiting previously has been colonized by our own or, like the United
States and Canada, has been colonized by a common predecessor. Much
is familiar. Many, if not all of the inhabitants, speak our language. We
drive on the same side of the road. We eat the same foods. But much will
be different, sometimes obviously and sometimes more subtly. And the
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proximity, indeed the intermingling, of two cultures makes aspects of each
all the more striking.
This analogy occurs to me as particularly apt as I encounter, really for
the first time, the debate over the Revised Uniform Partnership Act (RUPA)
and partnership fiduciary law in the context of this excellent symposium. I
come, of course, from the land of corporate law which, like partnership law,
has a colonial antecedent in fiduciary obligation. And much like the carica-
tured American tourist, I will undoubtedly be conspicuous in my bad man-
ners and cultural arrogance. But, like that caricature (and really quite like
myself as well), I will be direct. For what I find in this foreign land is that
its Emperor, the centerpiece of the debate over RUPA, is stark naked. This
debate is, I shall argue, a debate about nothing, because it has entirely ig-
nored, except superficially, what is important.
Having undoubtedly already ruffled some feathers, I shall be more
specific. There are two points at which the debate fails to engage its sub-
stance. Each point is strikingly characterized by the way in which meta-
phors, labels, and just plain rhetoric substitute for any meaningful analysis.I
The first point is the broadly structural normative argument that has been
characterized as the debate between contractarianism and the fiduciary
approach. In evaluating this issue, I feel much like a visitor from a former
colonial power, encountering a familiar form that has completely lost its
meaning. The second point is in the fight over RUPA's fiduciary provisions.
Here I feel like a visitor from a sister colony, encountering a common norm
that has grown differently when rooted in different soil.
My purpose in evaluating this debate is not to advocate a particular
point of view, although that will undoubtedly be a byproduct (and it is no
secret where my sympathies lie). Rather, it is to evaluate the extent to which
the argument has failed to go beyond the level of rhetoric and metaphor to
grapple with the real issues and to suggest some different ways of thinking
about fiduciary issues in the context of this very important discussion. My
conclusion is that the debate largely has missed the point. With a camera
1. There are two significant exceptions. The first exception is the work of Professor
Allan Vestal, which is cited throughout this essay. Professor Vestal's work identifies and
argues from some of the core values underlying fiduciary obligation. However, I think it is
fair to say that Professor Vestal does not quite get to the bottom of the core values. The other
exception is the work of Professor Larry Ribstein, which although sometimes over-relying on
the contract metaphor, consistently has been frank about Professor Ribstein's view of the
importance of efficiency values purportedly furthered by the contractarian model. However,
Professor Ribstein has oversimplified matters largely by failing to recognize the importance
of other values in pursuing that ultimate goal. It is important for all business lawyers to
remember that Adam Smith wrote not only The Wealth of Nations; he also wrote The Theory
of Moral Sentiments.
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slung around my neck and a loud Hawaiian print shirt on my back, let me
then go exploring.
L The Complete Irrelevance of the Contractarian/Fiduciary Debate
The debate over RUPA consistently has been characterized as one over
contractarianism versus some "other" model, usually described as the fidu-
ciary or mandatory model. 2 Drawing on the history of the predecessor
Uniform Partnership Act (UPA), which sought to provide a default contract
for those persons who found themselves, whether intentionally or not, in
partnerships without formalized agreements, a significant question concerning
the drafting of RUPA appears to be the extent to which the goal was to
provide anything more than that - a simple default contract. Largely
forgotten, however, is the origin of the partnership form of business in
common law and before that in observed human behavior.3 Rather, much of
the debate seems to assume that partnership is a statutory creature whose
birth dates to the drafting of the UPA. 4 And not only is partnership a
statutory creature; it is a statutory creature whose principal purpose is to set
out a form contract. Consequently, the partnership is a creature of contract,
and the only issue worth discussing (other than its specific terms) is the
extent to which the state may legitimately prescribe terms for those who
choose to vary them. Because the starting point of discussion is, however,
that partnerships are contractual, and because contract law has developed on
the underlying value of freedom of contract, proponents of state-mandated
terms bear a heavy burden of proof. In summary, partnerships are contrac-
tual, people are free to arrange their own contracts, and the state should keep
out beyond the extent to which it regulates other contracts. Q.E.D.
The argument is as understandable as its origins are plain, and this is
where I feel like the visitor from the colonial power. The contractarian/
fiduciary or mandatory/enabling argument began in corporate law. How-
ever, the argument's origins in corporate law were not in legal conclusions,
but rather in behavioral analysis. Starting with a set of assumptions about
human motivations and conditions under which they flourish, Fama and
2. Allan W. Vestal, Fundamental Contractarian Error in the Revised Uniform Partner-
ship Act of 1992, 73 B.U. L. Rnv. 523, 523-24 (1993).
3. See id. at 532, 537-45.
4. The overstatement in the text is only a little unfair. Of course all of the Future of
the Unincorporated Firm Symposium participants know something about the origins of partner-
ship law. They simply write as if they do not, and that appears to have had a significant
impact on the course of the debate.
5. Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL. ECON.
288, 289 (1980).
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Jensen and Meckling6 argued that the appropriate way to think about the cor-
porate legal fiction was as contractual. To a large extent, this analysis was
more descriptive than normative and merely offered a way of thinking about
the ways in which real persons underlying the juridical person related to one
another. It remained for legal scholars with varying degrees of economic,
psychological, sociological, and philosophical sophistication to take the
metaphor and incorporate it into the normative enterprise of legal criticism.
Although these scholars sometimes permitted the metaphor to replace analy-
sis, more often it served as a shorthand for the behavioral assumptions upon
the basis of which these scholars criticized corporate law. Because the form
we call the corporation is not, in legal reality, a contract in the more typical
way that a partnership agreement is, however, the contractual metaphor
rarely took on a life of its own.7
The corporation as contract metaphor is one that I have consistently
rejected, less because of its descriptive power (which it admittedly has) than
because of the assumptions said to underlie it and the norms that were
invariably (although not inevitably) attached to it. But the use to which the
contractual notion has been put in the RUPA debate borders on the absurd.
The contractual metaphor has been used as the ground on which to question
the legitimacy of fiduciary obligation in partnerships at all.
Again, the starting point of the debate is that partnerships are contrac-
tual in nature. This is sometimes explicitly stated, but is almost invariably
assumed. This assumption is evident from the almost universal description
of fiduciary duties as "gap fillers," again taken from the context of corporate
law. Gap-fillers to what? To the contract that is the partnership, of course.
Once one begins from the premise that a relationship is contractual, it is easy
(although, as I and others have argued, not inevitable) to assume that the dom-
inant value is contractual freedom. Yet, to paraphrase Justice Frankfurter: to
say that a relationship is contractual only begins analysis; it gives direction
to further inquiry. 8 What is the purpose of permitting this particular contrac-
tual relationship to exist? What are the norms to be served, and the back-
ground assumptions upon which they are built? These are questions that ap-
pear to be answered superficially, if at all, in the current partnership debate.
6. Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Management
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308-10 (1976).
7. The metaphor has, in my view, sometimes been taken to extremes. See FRANK H.
EASTERBROOK & DANIELR. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 15-25
(1991); Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, Opting Out of Fiduciary Duties: A Response to
the Anti-Contractarian, 65 WASH. L. REv. 1, 7-18 (1990); see also Victor Brudney, Corporate
Governance, Agency Costs, and the Rhetoric of Contract, 85 CoLUM. L. REv. 1403, 1411-20
(1985) (providing excellent critique of excesses of this theory).
8. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 85-86 (1943).
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Before dealing with these questions in the context of that debate, how-
ever, there is a fundamental point to be made. The issue of the nature of
partnership often has been described as one of a contract model versus a
fiduciary model. The dominant conclusion that partnership is contractual
appears to be taken to exclude the fiduciary. This is particularly evident in
the Reporter's Comments from RUPA. But, if I may be so direct, this is a
ridiculous conclusion. All fiduciary relationships originate in some form of
consent, and nearly all of those that involve property or commerce are
contractual. Trustees and agents, for example, agree to serve as such or, in
the case of the latter, at least consent to enter the relationship that carries
with it the agency label. And, typically, trustees and agents expect to be
paid. Although they may well expect a salary in contrast to partners who
share profits, that hardly eliminates the self-interest of their motivation in
consenting to the relationship. Moreover, agents often are compensated in
ways that place their own interests in direct conflict with the interests of their
principals. That conflict does not make them any less agents. Thus, the fact
that the partnership relationship is essentially contractual says absolutely
nothing about the obligations and consequences of that relationship, other
than that it is voluntary. To conclude anything further is utter nonsense.
A perfect example of the conclusory nature of these discussions is
provided by Professor Hynes. 9 In discussing the nature of partnership, he
juxtaposes the options as "simply a contract," with its implicit promise of
flexibility, or as "something more than a contract, involving inherent fidu-
ciary duties that constitute a mandatory core."10 Before concluding, with
absolutely no analysis, that "[t]he partnership relationship is most understand-
ably viewed as a contractual relationship in all of its respects,"" he de-
scribes the alternative as approaching a natural-law perspective.
One can, perhaps, understand the puzzlement of an outsider. What, for
example, is "simply a contract"? Granted, we all took a course in law
school with that name; and there are contract treatises on our library shelves.
But does Professor Hynes, or anybody else for that matter, really believe that
there is a simple thing called "contract" that permits parties to do whatever
they want, short of fraud or crime? Even the simplest of contracts carries
with it myriad restrictions, not only from within contract doctrine itself, but
also from other forms of law and regulation - from constitutional prohibi-
tions on our freedom to transact, to the entire corpus of property law that
defines our right to transact in the res of the contract, to employment and
9. J. Dennis Hynes, iduciay Duties and RUPA: An Inquiry into Freedom of Contract,
58 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 29 (Spring 1995).
10. Id. at 38-39.
11. Id.
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labor laws that regulate the way we contract with people for their services,
to family law that restricts the manner in which we can contract with speci-
fied others.12 If there is no such thing as "simply a contract," then what does
it mean to contrast it with "more than a contract," involving fiduciary duties?
Surely when a business corporation enters into a simple employment contract
with an officer, it expects to rely on the fiduciary obligations implicit in that
relationship. When I employ my stockbroker to make purchases on my
behalf, I assume the same. When a bank trust department accepts, for a fee,
the management of an estate, the testator surely expects that the bank will
behave in a fiduciary manner towards the estate beneficiaries. Whether
supplemented by regulation or common law, law or equity, it ought to be
abundantly clear that there is no such thing as "simply a contract" as Profes-
sor Hynes describes. Nor does Professor Hynes ever tell us why a partner-
ship is "most understandably viewed" as contractual. Without such an
explanation it is difficult to see what purpose, if any, this description serves.
Moreover, concluding that the doctrine of fiduciary duty has a moral
component does not necessarily relegate it to the somewhat unpopular realm
of natural law. There are other moral theories. Professor Hynes need not
struggle with Aquinas, or even Kant. He could simply read Adam Smith. 3
Finally, as I will later discuss, if one is somehow offended by the moral
aspects of the law, there are a number of functional arguments that support
the inclusion of a strong fiduciary doctrine in partnership law. All of this,
then, is to say that the debate is advanced not at all by referring to a partner-
ship as "simply a contract," a phrase that not only is analytically problem-
atic, but also that is descriptive of nothing.
II. (Completely) Missing the Point About Fiduciary Duty, or
the Power of Rhetoric over Reason
The debate over RUPA's fiduciary provisions apparently has generated
the kind of emotional responses normally reserved for religious or political
debate. And like the former (and increasingly the latter), the debate has
devolved into oversimplifications and rhetorical flourishes that obscure
analysis. While this may be appropriate, and even desirable, when one is
dealing in revealed truth (even the rationalist Aquinas had his limits), it is
disastrous for legal analysis. And disastrous is precisely what the fiduciary
provisions of RUPA turn out to be.
12. Dean Weidner appears to appreciate this point, at least as to the mandatory rules
provided within contract doctrine itself. See Donald J. Weidner, RUPA and Fiduciary Duty:
The Texture of a Reltonship, 58 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBs. 81, 97 (Spring 1995).
13. See infra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
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There are several places where the drafters and debaters took a wrong
turn. The first, and perhaps most surprising error, is doctrinal. Although
there is some evidence that the drafters and debaters looked somewhat
beyond case rhetoric, two things are apparent: they did not look very care-
fully, and they did not look beyond the narrow field of partnership law. Had
they done so, they would have found that most fiduciary applications today
permit some of the self-interested conduct now provided by RUPA, but
backstopped by a requirement of fairness. Fairness - and not self-abnega-
tion - is the hallmark of the modem fiduciary. The interpretation of fidu-
ciary duty in the partnership context as requiring the standard of Mein-
hard's14 rhetoric set up for failure the continuation of a meaningful fiduciary
obligation in the age of self-interest.
A second failing is attributable to the level of sophistication of the policy
debate. Characterized, on the one hand, by Professor Hynes's completely
unsubstantiated empirical assertions and, on the other hand, by vague claims
for the value of loyalty, the death knell for fiduciary obligation was sounded,
perhaps unintentionally, by Dean Weidner. His characterization of the
values at stake as "libertarianism" versus "paternalism" almost inevitably
doomed the policy based on the latter in a nation whose very founding
documents, not to mention many of its laws, literature, and customs, pro-
claim the moral primacy of individual autonomy. As I will argue, there are
purely instrumental reasons supporting a strong notion of fiduciary duty,
reasons that stem from the very efficiency concerns trumpeted by Professors
Hynes and Ribstein, and which can be resolved only by hard empirical
evidence (a task the drafting committee evidently declined to undertake).
Moreover, the moral choices are no more limited to "libertarianism" and
"paternalism" than they are to Professor Hynes's target of natural law. The
misused phrase "paternalism" in particular deals solely with choices that we
make for others. The phrase excludes the possibility that we, as a society,
may have a legitimate interest in the way business relationships are structured
and that this interest is reflected in our rules governing that relationship for
reasons having nothing to do with the welfare of the particular parties,
although the rules clearly affect their welfare. Among the reasons we
regulate marriage, for example, is to preserve a particular vision of a social
institution at least as much as for the protection of the parties, a fact nowhere
clearer than in recent debates over same-sex marriages. When, then, Judge
Cardozo proclaims at the conclusion of his introductory paragraphs in
Meinhard that "the two were in it jointly, for better or for worse," 5 he is
saying as much about the preservation of a social institution as he is about
14. Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545 (N.Y. 1928).
15. Id. at 546.
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a business contract. A more subtle understanding of the values undergirding
classic fiduciary obligation might have enriched the debate and perhaps have
resulted in better policy. For notwithstanding Dean Weidner's hope that the
RUPA "compromise" is a reasonable one,16 I will show that RUPA has
destroyed any semblance of fiduciary obligation.
A. Fiduciary Doctrine: Fact, Not Fiction
Despite the sweeping rhetoric of Judge Cardozo's opinion in Meinhard
and other expressions of fiduciary duty, and no matter how much I and others
may mourn its passing, the reality of modem fiduciary doctrine nowhere near
approaches its rhetoric. As I have extensively detailed elsewhere, 17 fiduciary
obligation as applied in corporate law, no matter how ringing the rhetoric or
how purple the prose, takes substantial account of self-interest in its doctrines.
In particular, corporate law has two fiduciary variations for application in
contexts similar to that of partnership. Moreover, even the fount of fiduciary
obligation - trust law - modifies classic fiduciary obligation to carve out an
area of fiduciary self-interest. The laws dealing with one of the ultimate
fiduciary relationships, marriage, and particularly antenuptial and settlement
agreements, are generally governed by some form of a fairness test rather
than self-abnegation. Finally, even partnership law, as applied in the cases,
relies on a fairness test to govern fiduciary self-dealing in appropriate cases.
Corporate law has grappled with fiduciary issues in a variety of contexts
and within a structure that is significantly more complicated than that of
general partnership law. One might have expected, therefore, that a look at
corporate fiduciary law could have been helpful to RUPA's drafters. Surpris-
ingly, it appears that the drafters completely ignored corporate law, thus
impoverishing the debate and resulting in unsatisfactory model legislation.
Despite this, I will show how corporate law can shed light on a sensible
interpretation of RUPA's fiduciary provisions (albeit not one apparently
contemplated by the drafters) in a manner consistent with the professed
intentions of the drafters.
It is clear from the RUPA debate that a major concern of all involved
was the obvious fact that each partner has a legitimate self-interest in the
partnership and its business. The question then arises how partners can be
expected to function as fiduciaries, "renouncing all thought of self," when
16. Donald J. Weidner & John W. Larson, The Revised Uniform Partnership Act: The
Reporters' Overview, 49 Bus. LAW. 1, 28 (1993).
17. Lawrence E. Mitchell, Fairness and Trust in Corporate Law, 43 DUKE L.J. 425,
426-27 (1993) [hereinafter Mitchell, Fairness and Trust]; Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Death
of Fiduciary Duty in Close Corporations, 138 U. PA. L. Rwv. 1675, 1681-82, 1688-92 (1990)
[hereinafter Mitchell, Death of Fiduciary Duty].
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self-interest led them to the partnership in the first place. The RUPA answer
is a blanket permission to act in a self-interested manner, thus, as Professor
Vestal and others have observed, turning cooperating venturers into adversar-
ies.
Such a stark approach was completely unnecessary. Corporate law has
faced the same problem. One context in which corporate law has reached a
reasonable compromise is in that of the fiduciary obligations of controlling
stockholders. Like partners, controlling -stockholders have a legitimate
financial interest in the enterprise, one for which they paid and from which
they expect to reap a reward. Unlike partners, however, the power of such
a stockholder is not the simple consequence of stockholding, as it is of having
the status of a general partner. Power is, rather, a consequence of having
enough stock to control the corporate machinery. And in the corporation,
unlike the mutual agency that is the partnership, control is all or nothing.
Once a controlling stockholder achieves that status, she, by definition, always
wins. She wins by controlling machinery, the board of directors, put in place
to serve as the stockholders' fiduciary. The completely vulnerable position
in which this puts minority stockholders leads to the controlling stockholder's
fiduciary duty.
But the same problem presents itself. If the controlling stockholder is
to act as a fiduciary, if it is to act in a self-abnegating manner, how is it to
fulfill its own legitimate financial interest in becoming a stockholder in the
first place? And who in their right mind would risk becoming a controlling
stockholder if no reward could be reaped?
The simple answer is that self-abnegation is not required. Rather, a
more subtle variation of fiduciary obligation is applied in the form of a
two-part inquiry. The first part requires a determination of whether self-
dealing took place at all. Courts look not only at the benefit received by the
fiduciary controlling stockholder in answering this question; they also look at
whether the beneficiary minority stockholders suffered detriment as a result.
Only if the transaction at issue meets both parts of the test - benefit to
fiduciary and detriment to beneficiary - is the next inquiry made. The
second inquiry asks whether the transaction was fair despite the self-dealing.
A classic example of the application of this test and the context for which
it was designed is provided by the famous Delaware case of Sinclair Oil
Corp. v. Levien,18 in which minority stockholders accused the controlling
parent of violating its fiduciary duty by causing the corporation to declare
substantial dividends.19 The court held that the parent did not violate its
fiduciary duty because both the controlling and minority stockholders received
18. 280 A.2d 717 (Del. 1971).
19. Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720-21 (Del. 1971).
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the proportionate dividends to which they were entitled, and thus the fair-
ness test was not applied.' Conversely, in Burton v. Exxon Corp.,21 the court
required application of the fairness test (and found fairness) when the control-
ling stockholder declared dividends on its preferred stock, but not on the
common stock held by the minority. Because the fiduciary received some-
thing to its benefit and the detriment of the minority, an evaluation of fidu-
ciary fealty required further inquiry.?2 It should be obvious that the fairness
test will be required whenever the fiduciary contracts with the corporation. 1
Although in the eyes of a fiduciary traditionalist the test is not beyond
criticism (at least as applied),' it has quite a respectable pedigree, tracing
back at least as far as Justice Douglas's opinion in Pepper v. Litton,' an
opinion that competes with Meinhard for the sweep of its language (and one
in which, incidentally, the Supreme Court was unanimous). Writing for the
Court, Justice Douglas noted that:
[A fiduciary] cannot use his power for his personal advantage and to the
detriment of the stockholders .... For that power is at all times subject
to the equitable limitation that it may not be exercised for the aggrandize-
ment, preference, or advantage of the fiduciary to the exclusion or detri-
ment of the cestuis.?
Thus, detriment to the beneficiary has long been an accepted part of fiduciary
breach, a fact that might have been discernible to the participants in the
RUPA debate and that might have led to a different outcome if the analysis
had not been obscured by fiduciary rhetoric.
It is possible to read RUPA's fiduciary provisions as establishing this
benefit/detriment test. Section 404(e) permits a partner to further his own
interest without violating a duty under the partnership act or agreement. 27 On
its face, this provision either means nothing or is internally inconsistent with
Section 404(b)(2).1 The provision may mean nothing, for no strain of law
20. Id. at 722.
21. 583 F. Supp. 405 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
22. Burton v. Exxon Corp., 583 F. Supp. 405, 420 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
23. Mitchell, Fairness and Trust, supra note 17, at 481-82. The reason, of course, is
that the contractual consideration will not be the same on both sides, and thus the fiduciary
will always receive something the beneficiary does not receive. This seems to be the reason
that the fairness test (or its statutory surrogate) always is applied in interested director trans-
actions. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (1996); Marciano v. Nakash, 535 A.2d 400,
404 (Del. 1987).
24. Mitchell, Fairness and Trust, supra note 17, at 471-72.
25. 308 U.S. 295 (1939).
26. Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 311 (1939) (emphasis added).
27. REvIsED UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT (1994) (RUPA) § 404(e), 6 U.L.A. 58 (1995).
28. Id. § 404(b)(2).
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of which I am aware prohibits a partner, simply because he holds that status,
from furthering his own interest unless he does so by dealing adversely or in
competition with (and therefore to the detriment of) the partnership. If these
are the situations contemplated by Section 404(e), then that Section is facially
inconsistent with Section 404(b)(2), which prohibits partners from dealing
adversely or in competition with the partnership. Assuming, reasonably I
think, that the drafters could not have meant Section 404(e) to be meaning-
less, it can be reconciled with Section 404(b)(2) by interpreting them together
as a restatement of the benefit/detriment test: A partner breaches no statutory
or contractual duty to the partnership or its partners by engaging in transac-
tions with, or in competition with, the partnership, unless such transaction or
competition results in detriment to the partnership or to the other partners.
Thus, statutory inconsistency can be eliminated and partnership fiduciary
duty can be tied into a long-standing, rich body of law without any stretch of
statutory language. Indeed, the use of the word "adverse" in Section
404(b)(2) but not in Section 404(e) further supports this interpretation. The
fact that the drafters themselves undoubtedly were familiar with this body of
law suggests, although perhaps weakly, that this model of fiduciary obligation
at least subtly informed their drafting.
The remaining question under such an interpretation would be the
consequence of finding that a partner's self-interested conduct resulted in
detriment to the partnership and to the other partners. The most reasonable
statutory interpretation, in light of the absolute prohibition articulated in the
statute, is that such a finding concludes the issue of breach, with traditional
remedies such as a constructive trust or disgorgement imposed upon the way-
ward partner. An alternative interpretation, although one with no statutory
support, would be that such a finding merely invokes a judicial fairness test
like the one applied in corporate law. This approach, I regret to say, appears
more consistent with the drafters' intent to restrict fiduciary obligation. On
the other hand, it would be inconsistent with the drafters' desire to limit
partnership litigation; after all, prohibitions are much easier to apply. But it
is not my purpose here to explore these alternative interpretations thoroughly.
Instead, I offer them as a way of highlighting the lack of subtlety and nuance
generally employed in the RUPA drafting and policy debate.
But even this compromise alternative need not have been accepted all or
nothing. Corporate law provides other mechanisms that could be used either
with or in place of the benefit/detriment test. For example, at least in part-
nerships of more than two members, the interested director approach could
be used. While also subject to criticism, 29 this approach sets out statutory
procedural requisites that must be followed by a corporation's board of
29. Mitchell, Fairness and Trust, supra note 17, at 440-42.
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directors before permitting one of their own to do business with the corpora-
tion. Whereas the decentralized management of the general partnership
would require some procedural modifications, the idea of some form of
disinterested approval coupled with a fairness or reasonableness standard
presents a compromise between self-abnegation and the complete elimination
of fiduciary obligation. Again, it seems astonishing that such a possibility
was entirely overlooked in the RUPA debate.
A final approach developed by corporate law (or actually a series of
variations on the central approach) applies in a context like that of the con-
trolling stockholder (and thus more like the partnership) of the close corpora-
tion. The failure to look to this body of law in the RUPA debate is particu-
larly ironic because close corporation law itself expressly is an adaptation of
partnership law, and thus the evolution of partnership rules in a different but
related field could have been instructive. Although the law has devolved to
a point where it no longer approaches classic fiduciary law,3" the tests devel-
oped by courts and later legislatures to deal with the problems of minority
stockholder oppression in close corporations provide another set of alterna-
tives that might have avoided the wholesale abrogation of partnership fidu-
ciary duty and could have been tailored to deal with the specific concerns of
the advocates of party autonomy. Obviously one of the main corporate char-
acteristics leading to the need to deal with oppression - relative indissolubil-
ity - is not present in the general partnership, but partnership dissolution is
not costless and therefore, as a practical matter, not always readily available.
Moreover, some of the problems dealt with by the close corporation laws,
like disparate treatment of stockholders resulting from dealings with the
corporation (e.g., excessive salaries) are also issues that can arise in the
partnership setting.
B. Fiduciary Policy: Beyond Labels
If the doctrinal battles over RUPA's fiduciary provisions are character-
ized by a distinct lack of imagination, the policy debates are notable for their
stunning failure to move beyond labels and metaphor. Although Dean Weid-
ner's unfortunate characterization of the argument as one of libertarianism
versus paternalism may have contributed to this tendency, 3' ,the commentators
appear largely to have been unable to move beyond gross and unsubstantiated
assertions of efficiency and fairness. I will briefly comment on the former
and spend the balance of this Article exploring the various policy bases for
strong fiduciary obligation, most of which have been ignored in this debate.
30. Mitchell, Death of Fiduciary Duty, supra note 17, at 1691-92.
31. Dean Weidner's understanding of the issues appears to be more nuanced. Weidner,
supra note 12, at 81.
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1. Efficiency Requires Proof, Not Assertions
There is a fashion in law and economics, rapidly fading except for a few
die-hard advocates, 32 to assert that economically efficient outcomes are
reached by agreement of the parties (whose agreement in fact proves eco-
nomic efficiency)33 who know their own interests, and that state interference
with this agreement is therefore likely to be inefficient. It is not that some
parties will not in fact be hurt by judicial noninterference and that the rule
of efficiency is invariant. Rather, the advocates of efficiency believe that
judicial interference decreases overall welfare so that it is unreasonable
(inefficient) to tailor laws to protect such parties.
Although law and economics practitioners are coming to realize the
limitations of this theory, as well as to explore in more detail the conditions
under which it may be true, it is critically important to note that certain con-
ditions must in fact be true in order for the proposition to hold. Among the
conditions are the requirements that the parties have relatively equal informa-
tion, or access thereto, and have relatively equal bargaining power, and that
each of the parties expects the others to pursue their respective interests.
In the RUPA debate, these presumed conditions are transformed into
factual assertions. Professor Hynes, for example, makes heroic assertions
of fact without the slightest supporting evidence as illustrated by the follow-
ing passage:
Persons entering into a partnership relationship ordinarily bargain from
an approximately equal position, an equality created by the fact that each
party typically has something of near-equal value to offer the other. This
is the reason partnership status is being offered by one party and sought
by the otherY3
There are at least three factual assertions in this brief passage alone, not
one of which is necessarily obvious or supported by evidence. It may be the
case that persons negotiating a partnership bargain from equality, but this is
not something that Professor Hynes knows. Moreover, equality itself is a
rather fuzzy concept. Even assuming some form of bargaining equality
between the parties, we need to identify the respects in which such equality
is legally relevant. Professor Hynes seems to identify this in the next clause
32. Compare William W. Bratton, Game Theory and the Restoration of Honor to
Corporate Law's Duty of Loyalty, in PRoGREssIvE CORPORATE LAW 139, 146-48 (Lawrence
E. Mitchell ed., 1995), and Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks
of Contracts, 81 VA. L. REV. 757, 758-66 (1995), with Larry Ribstein, Fiduciary Duty
Contracts in Unincorporated Firms, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 537 (1997).
33. For an explanation, see Richard A. Posner, The Ethical and Political Basis of the
Efficiency Norm in Common Law Adjudication, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 487, 491-97 (1980).
34. Hynes, supra note 9, at 40.
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(and factual assertion), that "typically" each party offers the other something
of "near equal value." Thus, the relevant equality is that of consideration
for the partnership enterprise. But valuation itself is a notoriously elusive
concept and depends critically not just on parties' current information, but
on their ability to foresee future events as well." Value depends on the
future returns to be generated by a partner's contribution. Partners may
have different information with which to predict these returns. Or, giving
a different sense to equality, partners may have different abilities to process
and evaluate the same information. One might say, in response to this last
point - that's too bad - that capitalism is designed to permit the more
talented to triumph over the less so. But when one is dealing with a cooper-
ative business enterprise, the longevity and stability of which is based quite
centrally on the relationship of the parties, it seems reasonable to consider
more seriously the reality of partners' equality before simply asserting it.
Finally, Professor Hynes asserts that this equality of consideration is
what leads the partners to enter into the relationship in the first place. This
assertion is neither logically obvious nor factually supported. The logic
again depends upon the meaning of equality. The paradigm case contem-
plated by Professor Hynes's assertion is one in which two partners contrib-
ute an equal amount of money. That, I submit, is the only case in which
one can unequivocally assert that the partners have contributed something
of equal value. But instinct and experience (and only that - I have no
empirical support) suggest that this is not the typical case. In the typical
case, the parties will offer each other something different, including unique
assets such as intellectual property or skills that may not yet be tested. One
assumes that each party believes the other to be offering something of equal
value. But their agreement will be efficient only if the parties are correct.
Finally, Professor Hynes has no way of knowing that most partnerships
are formed because of what each party has to offer the other. Drawing only
from the admittedly small sample of reported cases and making no attempt
to quantify, I have explored elsewhere the variety of ways in which close
corporations come into being.36 Certainly, family relationships, inheri-
tances, and friendships make strong and frequent appearances in the cases,
suggesting that the commercial joint venture paradigm offered as typical by
Professor Hynes is only one of many possibilities. Without empirical
verification, we simply do not know. To change literally hundreds of years
of partnership law would itself require fulfillment of a substantial burden of
35. This is a different aspect of the importance of the foreseeability concept that Pro-
fessor Vestal describes.
36. Lawrence E. Mitchell, Professional Responsibility and the Close Corporation:
Toward a Realistic Ethic, 74 CORNELL L. REv. 466, 486-91 (1989).
RUPA'S FIDUCIARY PROVISIONS
proof. 37 To do so on the basis of unsubstantiated empirical assertions is
irresponsible.
Of course, one suspects that efficiency is a bit of a subterfuge. For
regardless of the factual accuracy of Professor Hynes's assertions, RUPA's
drafters quite consciously assumed as their model the larger sophisticated
partnership, in which all parties are represented by counsel. One wonders
why, given the policy of contractual freedom, one even needs partnership
law to govern such people (other than as to their obligations to creditors and
third parties). Rather than gutting much of partnership law to accommodate
such partnerships, a better approach might have been to draft a statute
governing inadvertent partnerships and the partnerships of less sophisticated
people, perhaps unrepresented by counsel, and let the new paradigm part-
nerships opt out entirely. One suspects that RUPA was drafted more to
benefit lawyers by giving them a fail-safe backstop than to benefit the
parties themselves. Moreover, by severely limiting fiduciary obligation,
RUPA benefits sophisticated lawyers and their clients, not only allowing
them to take advantage of the weaker parties, but providing them with
winning arguments in the case of ambiguous drafting. Efficiency, as used
in this debate, is a label for the protection of the wealthy and for the disad-
vantaging of the relatively weak.
2. The Values of Fiduciary Duty
Entirely apart from the question of efficiency, and apart from the
quality and persuasiveness of arguments in favor of the policy, is the nature
and function of fiduciary obligation. The argument supporting a strong
fiduciary obligation is couched in terms of some kind of ill-defined individ-
ual fairness or justice, concepts that are used synonymously, 3 but that I
believe to be distinctly different. 9 The notable aspect of this argument is
that it is articulated as favoring the protection of the individual, in contrast
to the utilitarian and therefore more socially oriented value of efficiency.
Characterizing the argument this way almost inevitably dooms fiduciary
duty for a number of reasons. First, unlike efficiency, fiduciary duty is
difficult (or at least more difficult) to model mathematically in economic
terms, although attempts have been made.' It thus lacks some of the
mathematical elegance and its accompanying sense of inevitability that can
37. See Vestal, supra note 2, at 536.
38. See generally LAWRENCE E. MITCHELL, THE SELFISHNESS SURPLUS (forthcoming
1998).
39. Id.
40. See generally 1 KEN BINMORE, GAME THEORY AND THE SOCIAL CONTRACT: PLAYING
FAIR (1994).
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be conferred on the efficiency argument. Moreover, the fairness argument,
because of its rooting in moral theory, can and often is characterized as
fuzzy, debatable, and uncertain in an era of moral relativism, and critics of
the doctrine, unschooled in moral and ethical theory, make little attempt to
understand its deeper underpinnings.4' In order to be persuasive, then,
arguments supporting the imposition of strong fiduciary duty must be much
more specific in identifying the social and individual benefits to be derived.
a. A Functional Approach to Fiduciary Duty
One way of providing such an argument is to look at the social benefits
conferred by fiduciary obligation. To evaluate this, it might be useful to
imagine the desirable characteristics of partnerships, by which I mean the
qualities that are likely to make them successful. Common sense tells us
that chief among these must be a sense of permanence and stability in the
partnership, a feeling that the partnership's longevity is such that long-term
business decisions and individual devotion to the partnership's affairs can
rationally be undertaken even by self-interested economic actors who might
otherwise flit among profitable opportunities. Particularly in light of the
relative freedom of partnership dissolution, assurances of stability are
important. It is no accident, for example, that as divorce laws have liberal-
ized, the rate of divorce has substantially increased.
No law or contract is likely to substitute for the trust and mutual regard
of the parties. But law can be used in a way that will help to foster the
development of trust and make it more rational.4' Trust is a device that,
among other things, reduces uncertainty in an enormously complex world.
Much is uncertain at the time parties enter into a partnership relationship.
Although each makes assumptions or predictions, foresight is hardly perfect.
Moreover, although presumably the parties trust each other to keep their
basic agreement or they would likely not enter into business together in the
first place,43 they have no way of assuring their partner's fidelity over time.
Finally, each may well have different interpretations of their mutual agree-
ment when problems arise.
Fiduciary duty provides a means of ameliorating these difficulties by
making trust rational. In the first place, fiduciary duty gives each party a
reason to trust the other in a long-term relationship of unforeseeable conse-
41. See, for example, Professor Hynes's characterization of fiduciary duty as approach-
ing natural law. Hynes, supra note 9, at 39.
42. See generally Lawrence E. Mitchell, Trust. Contract. Process., in PROGRESSIVE
CORPORATE LAW, supra note 32 (exploring this argument in much greater detail).
43. Id. at 191-93.
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quences because, backed by legal sanctions, it requires each party to act as
if it were trustworthy, even if circumstances incline the party to behave
badly. Moreover, by instructing the partners as to the type of behavior that
is required of them, it has the potential to forestall legal disputes by giving
the parties an incentive to negotiate. Just as Professors Hynes and Ribstein
are critical of the uncertainties that the prospect of adjudication imports into
partnerships, that prospect also has creative (and efficiency-enhancing) uses.
By discouraging litigation by making it unattractive, it makes negotiation
and compromise a more rational strategy - one that has the potential to
contribute to partnership stability. Only a person who was rigorously insis-
tent (and who could coherently defend) each person's absolute right to take
advantage of others could object to such a result. And those who would
object by arguing that such advantage-taking, rent-seeking, or profit-maxi-
mizing is socially advantageous are required to move the fiduciary status
quo by proving that greater wealth is created by opportunism than long-term
business stability. This is an argument that requires factual support rather
than a rehashing of simple neoclassical economic theory.
Thus seen, fiduciary duty has a distinct economic function. By provid-
ing a mechanism to assure business stability, fiduciary duty permits longer-
term management than would be rational with a combination of free dissolu-
tion and unbounded self-interest. Not only does this stability contribute to
the welfare of the particular enterprise, but it also has the potential to reduce
the dislocations that occur when an operating business falls apart. These
dislocations, for example, were a major part of the traditional reluctance to
dissolve profitable corporations,' and they are equally problematic in the
partnership context. Although creditors may eventually be paid and employ-
ees compensated (and hopefully reemployed), the delays and uncertainties
attendant upon partnership dissolutions have a cost - in particular, a cost
which can be amplified by heavily-litigated disputes that may attend dissolu-
tion following opportunistic party conduct. Again, the cases are quite
revealing as to the emotional turmoil that can result when partners feel
mistreated by one another. And again, the analogy to marriage is apt. -
One solution that is unattractive for a variety of reasons (not the least
of which is the unlimited liability of general partners) would be to restrict
partnership dissolution. A preferable solution, and the one traditionally
chosen by partnership law, is to provide a legal incentive for the parties to
get along by forgoing opportunistic conduct. This solution is, of course,
fiduciary duty.
44. See WILLIAM L. CARY & MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
CORPORATIONS 444-50 (6th ed. 1988) (noting that fact of corporate limited liability amplifies
reluctance to dissolve).
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Viewed in this way, fiduciary obligation is neither principally about
individual justice nor about the infiltration of some ill-defined (and presum-
ably unfashionable) moral theory into partnership law. Fiduciary duty is,
instead, a tool that is designed to serve the very same goals of social effi-
ciency as the more laissez-faire diminution of fiduciary duty that arguably
facilitates freedom of contract. In these terms, the relevant question is
which approach better serves efficiency goals. It is a question that must be
answered by fact, not theory. As far as I can tell, nobody has amassed the
facts necessary to answer the question.
One remaining argument from the conventional (neoclassical) fiduciary
argument proceeds as follows: If fiduciary protection were a desirable
characteristic of partnerships, we should see parties including fiduciary
protection in their contracts. There are several answers to this - each of
which I find conclusive.
The first and simplest answer is that the parties have never had to
contract for fiduciary protections. Partnership and its progenitor, agency
doctrine, have through long history and usage been filled with the rhetoric,
if not always the reality, of strong fiduciary obligation. Because fiduciary
duty evolved so thoroughly in the law (another reason, in neoclassical
parlance, to assume its validity), there never would have been any reason
for parties to develop contractual fiduciary protections. Nor would there
have been any need to include a fiduciary provision in the UPA in light of
that long history and well-developed case law, unless the statute's drafters
intended to abrogate the common law. There is nothing at all remarkable
in the absence of such a statutory provision, and contorted efforts to make
the accounting provision do the work of fiduciary duty45 are sadly misguided
and damaging to the intellectual integrity of the argument in support of
fiduciary obligation.
A second reason why the parties might not include fiduciary protection
in their contracts goes to the question of self-interest and, in particular, the
reality that most parties do not consider broader social interests when they
enter into business relationships. As advocates of contractual freedom
correctly note, fiduciary duty diminishes party autonomy and thus restricts
the flexibility of partners. Persons entering into a partnership, especially
with people they trust, might be unwilling to restrict their flexibility in the
unlikely (in their mind) event that they find themselves at odds with one
another. Moreover, the stronger partner (presumably, although not neces-
sarily, the partner with the money) may anticipate activities that could be
seen as taking advantage of his partner and may be reluctant to be ham-
45. See 2 ALAN R. BROMBERG & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, BROMBERG AND RIBSTEIN ON
PARTNERSHIP § 6.07 (1996).
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strung. Finally, limited foreseeability gives the parties a somewhat short-
term view, and this may obscure their ability or willingness to view the
business in longer terms.
All of these reasons are, of course, somewhat speculative. But the
reasons suggest that the parties themselves might not reach arrangements
that necessarily are socially optimal. More sophisticated statements of this
proposition recently have been made by Michael Klausner and William
Bratton. 6 Professor Klausner has applied the economics of network exter-
nalities to the contractual paradigm of corporate law and has found that the
results raise significant questions of the extent to which permitting radical
contractual autonomy actually enhances social value. Arguing that the value
of a corporate contract term may be related to the number of firms that use
it, and that such interdependence may have particular value with respect to
vaguer terms (one of which obviously is fiduciary obligation), he concludes
that: "[W]hen network externalities are present.., the outcome of decen-
tralized individual maximizing decision in the market will be path depend-
ent. Moreover, market forces may fail to produce socially optimal equilib-
ria."47 Thus, it is not at all clear that social interests are best served by a
strong ethic of contractual freedom in the partnership setting.
Professor Bratton draws upon game theory to argue that "contracting
can be inefficient," with the consequence that "the choice of legal institu-
tions (in contrast to that of contractual terms) can be the primary influence
on the efficiency of the outcome."I Bratton looks at game theory to find
that, contrary to the assertions of contractarians, bargaining may be ex-
pected to result not in one best alternative, but in a variety of equilibria,
thus obscuring the possibility that contracting always leads to the socially
optimal result. In light of this observation, he offers a trust-based model of
the firm that shares many characteristics with the observed legal/fiduciary
model in which "self-interest and honor interplay" in a way that ensures
both stability and efficiency.49
In light of all of these arguments, none of which appear to be addressed
in the partnership literature, it is a far leap to conclude that diminished
fiduciary duty and enhanced contractual freedom will result in efficient
partnerships and that parties contractually will arrive at the desired level of
fiduciary protection. Accepting as central the contract proponents' own
46. See Bratton, supra note 32, at 142; Klausner, supra note 32, at 758-66.
47. Klausner, supra note 32, at 763-64. Moreover, although Klausner deals specifically
with corporate law, he notes that his conclusions may apply to other long-term contractual and
similar relationships, one of which obviously is the partnership. Id. at 766 n.25.
48. Bratton, supra note 32, at 153.
49. Id. at 167.
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goals, their argument entirely fails. The result is that RUPA has been
drafted on a wing and a prayer and wholly in the absence of both sophisti-
cated argumentation and empirical justification.
b. The Social Importance of Fiduciary Duty: Social Norms and Ethics
By this point I think it is entirely clear that substantial arguments in
favor of strong and mandatory fiduciary obligations cannot only be made,
but can be made decisively without even joining issue on the ethical question
of the values to be served by fiduciary obligation. It is enough to assume
efficiency and hoist the contractarians on their own petard.
However, there is an ethical argument to be joined, for I think it worth
arguing that fiduciary duty serves more than the value of efficiency. Fidu-
ciary duty does, in a very real way, have - at least potentially - a mean-
ingful impact on shaping the kind of society we choose to be or to become.
In one sense, I do not really need to leave the world of efficiency to
make this argument, for to do so I draw upon the work of those proto-
utilitarians, David Hume and Adam Smith.5' Although there are differences
in their moral theories, in the interests of space, I will discuss them to-
gether, because in the respects most relevant to my argument it is in their
similarities that they are important.
Hume and Smith observed a world in which a person's conception of
good behavior derived from the observed reaction of others not only to his
own behavior, but to that of others as well. As Smith put it: "Every faculty
in one man is the measure by which he judges of the like faculty in an-
other. "51 From this, Smith and Hume posited the device of the impartial
spectator, who serves as a hypothetical reference point from which to judge
your own actions. Your actions would be governed by the supposed, ap-
proval or disapproval of the spectator.
The relevance of this philosophical approach to the world of partnership
law, and indeed to law in general, is the extent to which law has the capac-
ity to effect behavior by setting out social norms. Certainly Cardozo
realized the power of this fact and incidentally adopted an approach remark-
ably similar to Hume's and Smith's approach when he wrote in Meinhard:
A managing coadventurer appropriating the benefit of such a lease
without warning to his partner might fairly expect to be reproached with
conduct that was underhand, or lacking, to say the least, in reasonable
candor, if the partner were to surprise him in the act of signing the new
50. See generally DAvID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE (L.A. Selby-Bigge ed.,
Oxford Univ. Press 2d ed. 1978) (1739); ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS
(D.D. Raphael & A.L. MacFie eds., Liberty Fund 1984) (1759).
51. SMITH, supra note 50, at 19.
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instrument. Conduct subject to that reproach does not receive from
equity a healing benediction.52
There is nothing arbitrary or vague in either the rhetoric used or the ap-
proach taken by Cardozo. It is nothing other than Hume's impartial specta-
tor. The knowledge that one ought reasonably expect to be reproached if
caught inflagrante delicto simply is a dramatization of our intuitive moral
understanding that cheating on one's partner is wrong. No amount of care-
fully constructed efficiency arguments based on assumptions about human
nature can obscure the power and truth of Cardozo's imagery. Most of us
would be embarrassed if we were caught in the circumstances he described.
That ought to tell us something.
Contemporary legal thinkers generally accept the proposition (as I do)
that law and morality are not coterminous. But it is undeniable that we have
laws that derive from moral precepts and that we use our laws to enforce
moral precepts as well. The entire corpus of laws that have grown up
around our constitutional equal protection and due process laws are grounded
in the moral ideals of equality and justice. The laws may be efficient; they
may not. But even if all of these laws could be demonstrated to be econom-
ically inefficient on the basis of some neoclassical model, I suspect that we
would be hesitant to abandon these principles as legal precepts. Their very
existence as legal mandates binding on the state (and through it, on a variety
of forms of essentially private conduct) speaks volumes about the values our
society holds and the ways we think about ourselves. Rules such as these
are not inconsistent with our founding enlightenment vision of a nation of
autonomous individuals cooperating to facilitate their respective goods. Nor
are the rules inconsistent with a concept of market capitalism that envisions
rough competition among actors to ensure the best use of resources and thus
the greatest overall welfare. The rules are consistent, however, with a
concept of persons as a society and with the notion that economic and
political competitions are played out not in an environment of pre-Leviathan
lawlessness, but on the basis of a set of ground rules.
In the laws of business organizations, fiduciary obligation traditionally
has provided one of those ground rules. It may be that fiduciary doctrine
is not crystal clear, in the sense of a rule requiring traffic to stop at red
lights. But the argument from certainty can be overblown. Dean Weidner
suggests that a principle motivation behind the "reformation" of fiduciary
rules was the desire of lawyers to be certain that their negotiated agreements
would be upheld.53 For lawyers to argue that fiduciary duty creates signifi-
52. Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 548 (N.Y. 1928).
53. Weidner & Larson, supra note 16, at 23.
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cant uncertainty is specious. Anybody reading the cases soon develops a
sense of what is and what is not allowed. Moreover, anyone in doubt can
simply, like Cardozo, consult the impartial spectator. The literal enforce-
ment of contracts, on the other hand, creates the possibility of manipulation,
opportunism, and the exploitation of linguistic "loopholes," as business law
shows time and again. 4
We should move away from rhetoric and confront reality. The call to
self-abnegation in fiduciary case law has never quite been the reality. No
judge, not even Cardozo, appears to have expected partners to cast aside
their worldly longings. What the language conveys is an attitude, a way of
thinking about the relationship, which is not at all ambiguous for the lan-
guage in which it is couched. It is the attitude of the impartial spectator, of
the person who desires the approbation of his peers, as well as his own self-
respect. It is an attitude that expresses the ideal that some kinds of competi-
tion and some forms of risk taking are quite appropriate in some circum-
stances and not in others. It is an attitude well expressed in Labovitz v.
Dolan.'s In Labovitz, one of the partners stated: "[T]he risk we took was
that the business would not succeed. We did not take the risk that the
business would succeed so well that the general partner would squeeze us
out and take the investment for himself."56
It is, of course, within the power of the law to say that the risks of
appropriation are in fact risks that are undertaken by partners with respect
to one another. And there is a strong argument that RUPA's fiduciary
provisions do exactly that. Certainly by attempting to specify particular
aspects of fiduciary obligation and leaving the parties permission to specify
others, RUPA has destroyed the attitude of cooperation and common pur-
pose expressed by classic fiduciary doctrine and replaced it with a contract-
like structure that invites haggling over language and opportunistic exploita-
tion of loopholes. Perhaps this is what we want to achieve. But it is at
least a fair question to ask whether a society that destroys the ethic of
cooperation in its private organizations can long sustain the spirit of cooper-
ation within itself.1 It is a question that appears not to have been asked in the
RUPA debate.
54. Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Fairness Rights of Corporate Bondholders, 65 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 1165, 1215-22 (1990); Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Puzzling Paradox of Preferred
Stock (And Why We Should Care About It), 51 Bus. LAW. 443, 476 (1996).
55. 545 N.E.2d 304, 313 (l. App. Ct. 1989).
56. Labovitz v. Dolan, 545 N.E.2d 304, 313 (I. App. Ct. 1989) (quoted in Weidner,
supra note 12, at 91 n.47).
57. See generally Lon L. Fuller, Two Principles of Human Association, in NOMOS X:
VOLUNTARY AsSOCIATIONs 3 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1969).
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